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Will Carnivore Devour the Fourth?
An Exploration of the Constitutionality
of the FBI Created Software
I have chosen the velociraptor as the symbol of the FBI's pro-
gram Carnivore because Carnivore like the velociraptor is
small, merciless, ruthless and with virtual razor claws, slices
through our right to privacy, devouring the meat of our email
messages.
-Dr. John Baker1
Imagine sitting at your desk at 12:30 a.m. It has been a long
day and you cannot wait to tell your friend who lives in Arizona
about the latest work place gossip. You compose the salacious e-
mail, thinking it impossible for anyone but you and your friend to
see it. Would you include the same juicy details if someone, other
than the intended recipient, might be able read the message?
Would you even e-mail the letter in the first place? What if such
surveillance was not limited to e-mail but that invisible eyes might
monitor every move you make on the web? The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has made such surveillance possible with its cre-
ation of Carnivore, an e-mail and Internet activity monitoring pro-
gram.2 This program has received much criticism as an unjustified
intrusion into protected areas of privacy.
3
Carnivore essentially allows the FBI to read one's personal e-
mail. A law enforcement agent can sit on an internet service pro-
vider (ISP) and intercept e-mail sent to and from a criminal suspect
without notice. This search is passive and either the internet user,
the receiver or the sender of the email, never suspects that his e-
mail has been intercepted. 4
I See Dr. John Baker, The FBI Becomes You Big Brother, http://www.stop
carnivore.org/news.htm (last visited October 6, 2000) (arguing the unconstitution-
ality of Carnivore and how such FBI devices are creating an Orwellian world).
2 See John Schwartz, FBI Makes Case For Net Wiretaps; Carnivore System
Faces Fire On the Hill, WASH. POST, July 25, 2000 at E01.
3 See id.
4 See Margaret Johnston, FBI Demos, Defends Carnivore Surveillance Sys-
tem, COMPUTERWORLD MAG., July 24, 2000, at 10 (describing the Carnivore instal-
lation process. "Carnivore doesn't adversely affect the flow of traffic on the
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While the existence of Carnivore has been a proverbial thorn
in the side of civil libertarians, the passage of the USA Patriot Act,
which provides for an easier implementation of the program, has
exacerbated the privacy intrusions. 5 The Act, signed into law on
October 26, in the wake of terrorists attacks, has met much
opposition.6
This note focuses on the unconstitutionality of Carnivore as a
passive search in the context of the Fourth Amendment and under
federal wiretapping laws, both before and after the passage of the
Patriot Act. Even in its least intrusive form, Carnivore intrudes
upon one's reasonable expectation of privacy. Part I explores the
fundamentals of Carnivore as a crime-fighting tool. Although the
FBI advocates implementation of the software, groups such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Electronic Informa-
tion Privacy Center (EPIC) seriously question Carnivore's constitu-
tionality. 7 Part II explores the evolution of current wiretapping
laws. The Supreme Court originally focused on whether or not
wiretaps seized any tangible evidence. Seeing that they did not, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated.8 How-
ever, with the introduction of the notion that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects "people, not places," both the courts, as well as the
legislature, have held "content" wiretaps to stricter standard.9 The
culmination of these principles can be found in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, (ECPA), amended as recently as Oc-
tober 26, 2001.
Part III argues that, prior to the terrorist attacks of September
11, federal wiretapping laws, namely ECPA, did not cover uses of
network, and it can be installed for only as long as the court order allows."). See
also Carnivore FAQ, http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/carnivore-faq.html (last
visited October 6) (dispelling rumors about Carnivore's presence on the internet.
"It is important to note that Carnivore is a passive wiretap. It does not interfere
with communication. Some news reports falsely claim that Carnivore interposes
itself into the stream, first grabbing data, then passing it along.").
5 ACLU PRESS RELEASE, USA PATRIOT ACT BOOSTS GOVERNMENT POW-
ERS WHILE CUTrING BACK ON TRADITIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES, available
at http://www.aclu.org/congress/1110101a.html (last visited January 8, 2001)
(enumerating the problems with the Act, including the extension of Internet sur-
veillance programs under federal wiretapping laws).
6 Id.
7 See Ann Harrison, Critic Bash U.S. Plan for Surveillance Standards, COM-
PUTERWORLD MAG., July 19, 2000, at 6.
8 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Carnivore. Because of Carnivore's unique nature, the statute,
which only provided for the use of telephone taps, was not applica-
ble to this software situation. Congress tried to rectify this inapplica-
bility through the passage of the USA Patriot Act. These
amendments proved to only be partially effectual, as they did not
address the distinction between "content" and "non-content"
information.
Part IV suggests that whether analysis be under the pre-Patriot
Act wiretapping laws or post, the use of Carnivore, even in its least
intrusive form violates Fourth Amendment principles. The Fourth
Amendment is the guardian against unreasonable searches and is
implicated whenever one's privacy has been unconstitutionally in-
vaded.10 As a consequence of this violation, the use of Carnivore,
under existing law, constitutes an unreasonable search.
Finally, Part V concludes that since Internet users have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and because Carnivore, regardless of
the legitimization via the Patriot Act, invades this reasonable expec-
tation, Carnivore is unconstitutional. In finding Carnivore uncon-
stitutional, Part V suggests some legal remedies.
I. (A) THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CARNIVORE AND THE DEBATE
OVER ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY
While the concept of "sniffing" is not a novel one, the FBI has
managed to join the technology superhighway with its development
of Carnivore, the e-mail surveillance system.'" True to its
codename, the FBI admittedly explained that the appellation is de-
rived from the systems actions - "Carnivore chews all the data on
the network. 12 The Carnivore system consists of an ordinary per-
sonal computer running Microsoft Windows 2000 and some propri-
10 See ROBERT M. BLOOM AND MARK BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Ex-
AMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 14 (1996) (explaining "in addition to the provision
concerning warrants, the Fourth Amendment (in its first clause) prohibits 'unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.'").
11 See http://www.techweb.com/encyclopedia (last visited October 6, 2000)
(defining a "sniffer" as a piece of hardware or software that analyzes date on a
network).
12 See Carnivore FAQ, http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/carnivore-faq.
html (last visited October 6, 2000) (answering frequently asked questions about
Carnivore).
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etary (closed-source) software. 13 The computer, encased in a
"black box," is then installed, with the cooperation of the ISP, on
the ISP, itself.14 Carnivore is commonly referred to as a "packet
sniffer," meaning that it takes in packets of data, or traffic on the
Internet. 15 Carnivore then copies and records the data within the
box.' 6
More specifically, however, Carnivore functions in two ways.
First, it acts as a "content wiretap" and second as a "trap and trace/
pen register."'1 7 As a "content wiretap," Carnivore copies all of the
e-mail to and from a specific users account.' 8 This function is self-
explanatory. "X's" messages to "Y" may be retrieved as well as
"Y's" messages to "X." In addition, Carnivore is capable of collect-
ing all of the traffic of user, "X", while he is on an ISP. 19 In other
words, if X decides to go to www.abc.com and enter in certain data,
the FBI may have access to this data.
As a "trap and trace/ pen register," Carnivore functions at a
slightly less invasive level. Instead of copying the entire content of
any given e-mail, it will copy only the header (the "To," "From"
and "Re:" lines) of e-mail going to and from a specific account. 20 In
this capacity, Carnivore can also "list all the servers (web servers,
FTP servers) that the suspect accesses, but (cannot) copy the con-
tent of this communication." '2' In copying all of this information,
13 See About.com, http://www.about.com/computer/technology (last visited
October 6, 2000) (describing the fundamentals of Carnivore).
14 See Harrison, infra note 25 ("At present, Carnivore is installed by the FBI
as a 'black box' system that's attached to the networks of ISPs, which can't ex-
amine or access the system.").
15 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12 (explaining how "Carnivore acts like a
'packet sniffer.' All Internet traffic is broken down into bundles called 'packets.'
Carnivore eavesdrops on these packets, watching them go by, then saves a copy of
the packet it is interested in.").
16 See id.
17 See id. (A pen register is a device, normally attached to a telephone line
which collects numbers dialed to and from a specific location.).
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See About.com, supra note 13 (describing the way Carnivore functions as
a trap and trace/ pen register. "By scanning the subject lines and headers of incom-
ing or outgoing messages, the system identifies relevant communications among
selected individuals as part of a criminal investigation. Data deemed useful can be
off-loaded onto removable drives and retrieved through secure dial-up sessions.").
21 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
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Carnivore plays the role of a passive sniffer, collecting data virtually
undetected. 22
The most controversial aspect of Carnivore, however, is its re-
semblance to a "'trunk side" wiretap-"that is, a monitoring system
that takes in all communications running through a telephone office
to find the calls related to a suspect. '23 In its most "ferocious" ca-
pacity, Carnivore enables an FBI agent to access every e-mail, in-
cluding its contents and header information, sent and received by
every single customer of a given ISP.24
While an FBI agent may be able to retrieve all of this informa-
tion in the privacy of his own cubicle, participation of a third party
is required. Without cooperation from an ISP, agents cannot install
Carnivore's hardware, also known as a "black box."'25 Over 25
cases have been reported in which different ISP's have allowed the
implementation of Carnivore. 26 The details of these investigations
have not been released publicly.27 Although the FBI has received
the assistance of these ISP's, some, including EarthLink, are
staunch opponents of its incorporation because of possible uniden-
22 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
23 See John Swartz, Republicans Oppose FBI Scrutiny of E-mail, WASH.
POST, July 21, 2000, at Al (balancing the views of privacy advocates and those that
support Carnivore. Swartz points out that while the FBI et al have defended Car-
nivore, Clinton's overall plans for "policing the internet are running into sharp
opposition from Republican leaders.").
24 See id. (describing the ongoing controversy over Carnivore. "Critics object
to the fact that the system sorts through the communications of innocent people in
order to monitor suspects." The majority House Leader, Richard Armey com-
plained, 'Nobody can dispute the fact that this is not legal ... within the context of
any current wiretap law.').
25 See Ann Harrison, DOJ Signs Up Team to Review Carnivore, COM-
PUTERWORLD MAO., October 2, 2000, at 20 (describing the way in which FBI
agents install Carnivore. "Currently, Carnivore is installed by the FBI as a "black
box" system that's attached to the networks of Internet service providers, which
can't examine or access the system." This installation process has raised much con-
cern because while the cooperation of the ISP is necessary, no one but the ISP may
monitor Carnivore's use. When a law enforcement agent installs a traditional wire-
tap, however, the telephone company may monitor the use. Privacy groups feel
that this distinction, amongst others, make current wiretapping laws inapplicable
to Carnivore.).
26 See Margaret Johnston, FBI Demos, Defends Carnivore Surveillance Sys-
tem, COMPUTERWORLO MAO., July 24, 2000, at 10 (explaining that while the FBI
has demonstrated the system, its refusal to release the source code has caused
much criticism especially by the ACLU).
27 See About.com, supra note 13.
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tified constitutional violations.28 Cooperation of the ISP is man-
dated by law, under the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) passed in 1994.29
Even after unveiling the purpose behind the system and a sub-
sequent demonstration of its capabilities, the FBI has received
much criticism of Carnivore from groups other than ISP's. 30 The
ACLU and EPIC have repeatedly pointed out that "the potential
for abuse is high."'3' The ACLU first learned about the existence of
Carnivore in April, 2000 when attorney, Robert Corn-Revere 32 tes-
tified before the Constitutional Subcommittee. 33 In a letter dated
July 11, 2000, the ACLU's Director, Laura Murphy, and its Associ-
ate Director, Barry Steinhardt, explicated the group's concern over
the device. 34
"Carnivore ... cries out for Congressional attention if we are
to preserve Fourth Amendment rights in the digital age," wrote
Murphy.35 In voicing its concern about a need to act, the ACLU
differentiated Carnivore from its constitutional predecessor, the
wiretap.36 When an officer receives a warrant for a wiretap, he has
28 See Harrison, infra note 45 (explicating Earthlink's opposition to Carni-
vore. "The company resisted the installation of the secretive system because it
caused performance problems on its network. It also couldn't examine the technol-
ogy to determine if its capturing of e-mail, IP addresses and other traffic violated
the privacy of other customers.").
29 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1008 (Under § 1002(a)(3) "a telecommunications
carrier shall ensure that its equipment .. are capable of... delivering intercepted
communications and call-identifying information to the government, pursuant to a
court order"). See also U.S. Telecom v. FCC, 227 F. 3d 450 (D.C. Cir.2000) (detail-
ing the purpose behind CALEA. "Congress enacted (CALEA) 'to preserve the
government's ability, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to
intercept communications involving advanced technologies.., while protecting the
privacy of communications without impeding the introduction of new technologies,
features and services.'").
30 See Johnston, supra note 26.
31 See Ann Harrison, ACLU Calls For Limits on FBI's Carnivore System,
COMPUTERWORLD MAG., July 14, 2000.
32 Corn-Revere represented EarthLink, an ISP who refused to allow FBI
agents to attach the system to its network.
33 See Letter from Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU, to
Charles Candy and Melvin Watt, House Representatives, (July 11, 2000) (on file
with author).
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id. ("But unlike the operation of a traditional ... wiretap on a conven-
tional phone line, Carnivore gives the FBI access to all traffic over the ISP 's net-
work, not just the communications to or from a particular target.").
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access to the suspects phone call conversations, and only that sus-
pect's. The ACLU points out that Carnivore, in contrast, is capable
of reading millions of messages per second, not just those involving
the criminal suspect.37 Although the FBI may hone in on a speci-
fied suspect, everyone on the ISP, theoretically, is an equal target.
The only safeguard that internet users have is the "assurance that
the FBI will record only conversations of the specified target.
38
Such an attitude is the main reason for procedures required under
wiretapping law.39
In response to this super FBI tap, the ACLU calls for strict
legislation that reflects the notion that ISP has the burden of pro-
tecting its customers from clear invasions of privacy. 40 In closing,
the ACLU extended its desire to work with Congress on the draft-
ing of any such legislation.41
The ACLU is not the only civil liberties group that is up in
arms about Carnivore, EPIC has also expressed grave reserva-
tions.42 Marc Rotenberg, head of EPIC, questioned whether or not
Carnivore is a reasonable search and seizure.43 Precipitated by such
concerns and the lack of governmental response, EPIC and ACLU
separately filed a request on July 12, 2000, pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA), for the production of all documents
relevant to the Carnivore system.44 Despite this attempt, the FBI,
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See Letter for Barry Steinhardt, supra note 33.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See Harrison, supra note 7 (describing EPIC's concern over Carnivore's
continued use. David Sobel, EPIC's general Counsel asked, "Why wasn't some
moratorium on Carnivore announced?" "How can the administration on one hand
say they are trying to improve online privacy and also, at the same time, approve
the use of technology that appears to be inherently invasive?" Sobel complained
about the Clinton administration's supposed goal to protect online privacy and its
reluctance to address Carnivore.).
43 See John Schwarz, FBI's Wiretap Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST,
July 12, 2000 at Al.
44 See Press Release, EPIC (August 2, 2000) (explaining the need for public
disclosure of pertinent information, including Carnivore's source code. "The only
way that the privacy questions can be resolved is for the FBI to release all relevant
information, both legal and technical," said David Sobel, General Counsel for
EPIC.).
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was slow and inadequate in its response. 45 The first installment of
information, required as per a judicially-set release schedule, with-
held 200 pages of data and another 400 were "sanitized," containing
nothing but page numbers.46 The document text revealed only fun-
damental information such as the date of creation (February 1997)
and reviews of previous test.47
Dissatisfied with the dearth of data and the absence of a source
code (programming language in which Carnivore was written), Rot-
tenberg announced that EPIC intended to pursue litigation until all
relevant documents were disclosed.48 Taking these concerns once
again into the courtroom, EPIC demanded that something be done.
Rottenberg claimed that he was amazed by the Department of Jus-
tice's inability to "recognize the high level of public concern that
Carnivore has generated. '49
With hopes of putting the civil liberty group at ease, the U.S.
Justice Department appointed a team of government employees to
lead an investigation into Carnivore. 50 This appointment, however,
exacerbated the situation.51 The team, from the IIT Research Insti-
tute (ITRI), a not-for-profit research and development organiza-
tion associated with the Illinois Institute of Technology, was to
review Carnivore and to determine whether the tool contained a
sufficient amount of privacy invasive safeguards.52 The ACLU,
45 See Ann Harrison, Privacy Group Critical of First Release of Carnivore
Data, COMPUTERWORLD MAG., October 3, 2000, at 24 (detailing the minimal in-
formation revealed by the FBI -released Carnivore documents).
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See Press Release, EPIC, supra note 44.
50 See Robert Lemos, Carnivore Review: A 'Stacked Deck'?, http://www.zdtv.
com/news.html (last visited October 4, 2000) ("The panel of experts were ap-
pointed to review the security and reliability of Carnivore and whether the
software violated search and seizure provisions of the Constitution.").
51 See Ann Harrison, Government Error Exposes Carnivore Investigators;
ACLU Blasts Team for Close Ties to the Administration, COMPUTERWORLD MAG.,
October 5, 2000, at 20 (commenting on how the review committee is compromised
by their close government connections. ACLU director said, "by selecting people
with extensive government ties for what is supposed to be an independent review,
the executive branch has shown once again that it cannot be trusted with carte
blanche authority to conduct searches.").
52 See Lemos, supra note 50. See also Press Release, IITRI Delivers Draft
Report on Carnivore E-Mail Surveillance System Review, (November 22, 2000) (ex-
plaining how the "IITRI's more than 1,500 scientists and engineers focus on solv-
ing difficult problems in a variety of technologies. The Carnivore review team
2002] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CARNIVORE 313
however, definitively announced its outrage. 53 A governmentally
connected team, whose members included employees of the De-
partment of Defense, did not, in the ACLU's opinion, represent an
unbiased group of reviewers. Instead, the ACLU claims that the
DOJ "stacked the deck."'54
The ACLU further condemned an additional provision or-
dered by the DOJ which required that the Department "have the
final edit on the report and that the source code not be pub-
lished."'5 5 Other universities, who were in the running for commit-
tee selection, withdrew from the application process once this
condition was made known.5 6
Aside from the ACLU and EPIC, there is a third group vocal-
izing objections to Carnivore, ISP's. This group, although less polit-
ical than the champions of civil liberty, is just as significant, if not
more so, if Carnivore is to remain a viable crime fighting weapon.
Several ISP's have bashed Carnivore and the FBI for its implemen-
tation in over 25 cases.57
Notable criticism has come from the ISP, Earthlink Inc.58 Al-
though FBI agents presented Earthlink with a trap and trace order,
Earthlink refused to attach the system to its network.59 Robert
Corn-Revere, Earthlink's attorney, testified before the House Judi-
ciary Committee relaying his client's concern over the scope of Car-
nivore. 60 Corn-Revere noted that the system could be used to track
consisted of staff and senior faculty members from IIT's Chicago-Kent College of
Law.").,
53 See Harrison, supra note 51.
54 See Harrison ,supra note 51.
55 See Harrison, supra note 51.
56 See Ann Harrison, DOJ Signs Up Team to Review Carnivore, COM-
PUTERWORLD MAG., October 2, 2000, at 20.
57 See About.com, supra note 13. See also Steven Labaton and Matt Richtel,
Proposal Offers Surveillance Rules for Internet, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2000 at Al
(discussing how a legislative proposal concerning surveillance in cyber space failed
to address Carnivore. Such exclusion alarmed privacy advocates and civil liberty
groups).
58 See Bob Barr, Carnivore is Why New Laws are Needed for New Technolo-
gies, Computerworld Mag., August 16, 2000 (arguing that if not for a "decision by
Internet service provider EarthLink Inc. to litigate over the placement of the de-
vice on its network, which ultimately led to Carnivore's existence being publicly
revealed in a congressional hearing earlier this year," the FBI would have contin-
ued to use Carnivore in secret).
59 See Harrison, supra note 45.
60 See supra note 32. See also infra note 130 (Corn-Revere noted that he
would have cited the case for the committee, "but the pen register authorization
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
dissidents online, but more generally, involved issues of basic
human rights.61
Other ISP's have also objected to Carnivore. 62 William Schra-
der, chairmen of PSINet, a major ISP, said that he would never let
the government attach the little black box because of the wide ac-
cess to all of his users' activities. Schrader said, "I object to Ameri-
can citizens and any citizen of the world always being subject to
someone monitoring their e-mail ... I believe it is unconstitutional
and I'll wait for the Supreme Court to force me to do it.'"63
Certain Republicans and Democrats comprise the last group to
voice a myriad of concerns over Carnivore. 64 The House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary called a hearing, at the end of July, to discuss
privacy concerns over Carnivore. 65 Both parties equally expressed
outrage over the invasiveness of the device. 66 For example, Spencer
Bachus, (R - Ala.) sarcastically asked, "You can't go to AT&T to-
day and say, 'We are going to analyze all of the phone calls that go
through your system,' but you can do that with Carnivore? ' 67 An-
other Republican, J.C. Watts, (R - Okla.), was so concerned over
the unconstitutionality of Carnivore that he called for a moratorium
on its use until further investigations.68
The most devastating comments came from Robert Barr (R -
Ga.). Barr emphasized that the FBI contends that it has the author-
ity to "harvest" large amounts of data and then to filter out the
was an ex parte order and the subsequent proceedings... were conducted before a
Magistrate under seal.").
61 See Schwarz, supra note 43.
62 See Steven Labaton and Matt Richtel, Proposal Offers Surveillance Rules
for Internet, N.Y. TIMES, July 17th 2000 at Al.
63 See id.
64 See Margaret Johnston, House Panel Grills FBI Over Carnivore, COM-
PUTERWORLD MAG., July 25, 2000, at 10 (demonstrating how democrats and
republicans have joined forces in the ongoing debate over Internet privacy. During
testimony before the House Committee, Republican, J.C. Watts (Okla.) and Dem-
ocrat, Jerrold Nadler (NY), "launched a barrage" of questions upon the Depart-
ment of Justice concerning Carnivore's high potential for abuse.).
65 Testimony before the committee took place on July, 24, 2000.
66 See Johnston, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67 See Johnston, supra note 64 (quoting Bachus who said that the "FBI's
explanation raised concerns that some people in the FBI could have free reign to
check up on what their ex-spouses or political enemies were doing [on the
Internet].").
68 See Johnston, supra note 64 (expressing the Republicans' "grave concern
about the potential for privacy violations and skepticism that Carnivore's opera-
tions are as confined as the FBI says that they are.").
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unwanted information. "Those are two very, very large steps that
we are taking here ... I don't think that this has been well thought
out."
6 9
Democrats, too, expressed incense. Jerrold Nadler (D - NY)
emphasized that those who communicate with criminal suspect are
susceptible to privacy violations. Such violations, he said, might go
unnoticed.70
I. (B) THE FBI'S RESPONSE
The FBI has tried to respond to these growing concerns in sev-
eral ways. Aside from answering a multitude of questions advanced
by 25 media outlets, the FBI performed an actual demonstration of
the system at its headquarters. 71 In addition to such demonstration,
the FBI placed a specially designed, Carnivore devoted, website on
the Internet.72 The site is part of an ongoing effort to discuss the
topic of electronic surveillance openly and to share information
pertaining to Carnivore's capabilities. 73 The site features testimony
69 See Johnston, supra note 64 (quoting Barr who "complained that law en-
forcement officials are mistreating Internet service providers" with Carnivore. On
the one hand, Barr points out, the FBI is trying to break new legal ground with the
application of Carnivore to new technologies. On the other hand, the FBI is trying
to use authority that it does not have.).
70 See Johnston, supra note 64 (Nadler said that those who communicate
with criminal suspects would never know that their e-mail has been intercepted
unless a court case comes up and such information is revealed.).
71 See Letter from John Collingwood, Assistant Director of the FBI, to Brian
Gallagher, USA Today Editor, (July 24, 2000) ("correcting" several assertions
made in an editorial criticizing the FBI's use of Carnivore. Collingwood empha-
sized that "court orders authorizing the interception of criminals' e-mail come only
after rigorous review and the conclusion that there is probable cause that a crime is
being or has been committed." In addition, Collingwood defended the FBI by
pointing to the numerous questions that the FBI has answered and its willingness
to perform a demonstration of the system.). See Margaret Johnston, FBI Demos,
Defends Carnivore Surveillance System, COMPUTERWORLD MAG., July 24, 2000, at
10 (explaining that the FBI, in an effort to dispel criticism, gave a demonstration of
the system on July 21. During the demonstration, FBI official said that "they were
confident that the system is entirely legal.").
72 See http//:www.fbi.gov (last visited October 6, 2000).
73 See id. (recounting Donald Kerr's, Assistant Director of FBI's Laboratory
Division, testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary. Kerr discussed,
amongst other Carnivore related topics, the purpose behind the system and its
constitutionality.).
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given by Donald Kerr, Assistant Director of the Laboratory Divi-
sion of the FBI before the Committee on the Judiciary.74
Kerr's testimony constituted the main defense put forth by the
FBI. Faced with a "barrage" of cynical questions, Kerr vehemently
defended Carnivore's constitutionality. 75 Kerr began his testimony
by advancing the need for a system like Carnivore. 76 Specifically,
Kerr mentioned the perpetration of crimes such as terrorism, espio-
nage, information warfare, child pornography, and "serious"
fraud.77 After explaining each of these crimes in detail, Kerr dis-
cussed why the public should "have confidence in the FBI's lawful
use of Carnivore. ' 78 The first rationale involved the statutory pro-
tections made applicable to wire and electronic communications
under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of
1986. 79 Under the ECPA, all electronic surveillance requires some
form of a court order.80 In sum, the FBI must show probable cause,
74 On July 24, 2000, the Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the
functionality of Carnivore. Members of the ACLU and EPIC testified, citing the
privacy concerns mentioned above. Members of the FBI also testified offering
step-by-step information on the installation of the device and the procedure of
capturing data.
75 See Johnston, supra note 64 (commenting that the FBI, as well as the De-
partment of Justice, in general, "remained firm in their defense of Carnivore.").
76 See Kerr's testimony (explaining that "it has become common knowledge
that terrorists, spies, hackers, and dangerous criminals are increasingly using com-
puters and computer networks, including the Internet, to carry out their heinous
acts. In response to their serious threats to the Nation .. .the FBI responded by
concentrating their efforts and resources, to fight the broad array of Cyber-
crimes.").
77 See id. (listing the specific types of crimes that occur in the context of
computers).
78 See id.
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act) (1986)
hereinafter referred to as ECPA, (amending Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968). According to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) defines
"electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writings, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic, or photo-optical system that affects inter-
state or foreign commerce, but does not include (a) any wire or oral communica-
tion, (b) any communication made through a tone-only device, (c) any
communication from a tracking device, or (d) electronic funds transfer information
stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic
storage and transfer or funds.
80 See Kerr's testimony, supra note 76 (explaining that a search of one's elec-
tronic communication, as defined by the ECPA, requires a showing of probable
cause or "an ECPA created court order based upon relevancy for communications'
addressing and transactional record information." "Transactional record informa-
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and only after judicial review of the cause and authorization, may
an FBI agent install Carnivore. 81
Kerr next pointed out that while Carnivore is "configurable" to
gain access to unauthorized information (information not covered
by the warrant), a "filter" may be placed in the device to prohibit it
from doing so. 82 A filter allows Carnivore to discriminate against
certain types of information. A Carnivore "black box" with a spe-
cially designed filter will only retrieve the information requested
under the warrant. Theoretically, a filter will only allow Carnivore
to see suspect X's e-mail and other computer related activities while
ignoring the activities of the other thousands of ISP customers.
Kerr then addressed the argument that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123 and
2703 preclude the gathering of transactional information. 83 This
concern, according to Kerr, is not supported by any caselaw and
must therefore be invalid.84 In connection with this contention,
Kerr mentioned that the Supreme Court has found no Constitu-
tional requirement of probable cause for the acquisition of a crimi-
nal suspects transactional information. 85 Since probable cause is not
required and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and 3123 do not serve as a bar,
the FBI may gain access to transactional information without vio-
lating the Constitution. 86
Kerr concluded his testimony with a discussion of "why com-
puter network services (and the public) should not be fearful about
tion" includes "To" and "From" lines, routing, billing, or other information ob-
tained or generated by the Internet service provider.").
81 See id. (describing the FBI's burden to obtain authorization for
Carnivore).
82 See id. (explicating the benefit of a filter).
83 See id. (arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(2000)
does not prohibit access to the transactional information. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 pro-
vides that an order for a trap and trace device must include inter alia, the suspect's
name, the location of his telephone line, and his telephone number). See also 18
U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2000) governs governmental access to records concerning elec-
tronic communication service or remote computing service. Subsection (c) pro-
vides that an ISP may disclose "a record or any other information pertaining to a
subscriber." Opponents of Carnivore, according to Kerr, argue that "transactional
information" is not included in this language.). For an explanation of "transac-
tional information" see supra, note 12.
84 See id.
85 See supra note 76 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) holding
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in information given by a
banking customer to a third party financial institution).
86 See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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Carnivore's use."' 87 He relies heavily on the notion of trustworthi-
ness.88 For Kerr, the vast amount of trust placed in the FBI is the
safeguard against abusive use of Carnivore. "The FBI certainly
does not recruit honest and law abiding people only to employ
them in corrupt and dishonest ways."'89 In other words, since the
FBI are so trustworthy, customers of the ISP as well as the ISP's
themselves, should not worry about any unauthorized use of the
system.
II. LAWS GOVERNING CARNIVORE
As evidenced by these objections and responses to such, almost
every aspect of Carnivore is contentious and hotly debated. An-
other such aspect is the law governing the existence of electronic
surveillance. While proponents of Carnivore argue that Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
controls, opponents question its applicability. 90 While Congress did
87 See Kerr's testimony, supra note 76 (addressing whether the FBI would
ever take full advantage of Carnivore's ability to function without a filter. Kerr
focused on the caliber of FBI agents and how trustworthy they have been over the
years. "To become an FBI employee requires a substantial showing of trustworthi-
ness, lawfulness, and personal and professional integrity. The structure of the FBI
would quickly collapse if the agency and all of its employees could not trust with-
out reservation its new employees.).
88 See Kerr's testimony, supra note 76.
89 See Kerr's testimony, supra note 76 (contrasting the high level of trustwor-
thiness required by the FBI with the lower level required by others who work in
the telecommunications field. "Indeed, in contrast with the requirements placed
upon many of the personnel employed by telecommunication and computer net-
work service providers (who may have some role in implementing electronic sur-
veillance orders), all FBI employees are specifically sworn to uphold the
Constitution, obey the law, and to faithfully execute the laws of the land.").
90 See Margaret Johnston, FBI Demos, Defends Carnivore Surveillance Sys-
tems, COMPUTERWORLD MAG., July 24, 2000 (explaining how the FBI believes that
Carnivore operates in conformity with the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, ECPA. Johnston describes how "the FBI began developing Carnivore three
years ago when law enforcement officers began seeking and obtaining court orders
to intercept e-mail as part of their investigation... the result was (a system) de-
signed to operate in strict conformance with federal wire tap laws and the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act). See also Letter from Barry Steinhardt, supra
note 33 (questioning whether applicable federal law, ECPA, even allows the FBI
to serve an order on an ISP to obtain the addresses of incoming and outgoing
messages. Steinhardt, writing on behalf of the ACLU, concluded that while the
ECPA may cover collection of a suspect's e-mail it "is (not) clear that law enforce-
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not enact these federal statutes until the latter part of the 20th cen-
tury, electronic surveillance dates back to a time long before society
contemplated surfing the "net." 91 This issue first came before the
Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States where the Court held
that the interception of telephone conversations by federal law en-
forcement officials did not constitute a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.92 The Court reasoned that because law en-
forcement agents did not seize anything tangible, the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated. 93
Although the Court concluded that wiretapping was not sub-
ject to the Fourth Amendment, Congress soon removed the wiretap
"from the repertoire of evidence-gathering tool" by enacting the
Communications Act of 1934. 94 Interception of wire or radio signals
without the consent of the sender was rendered illegal by the fed-
eral statute. 95 The Communications Act, however had limits. It did
not allow for the technological advancements made by the telecom-
munications industry, namely its inapplicability to electronic bugs. 96
Goldman v. United States reinforced the legality of electronic
bugs.97
ment can install a super trap and trace device that (allows for) access to such infor-
mation for all of an ISP's subscribers.").
91 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status (visited
November 2, 2000) http://www.nap.edu/readingroom.books/crisis/D.txt. (chroni-
cling the birth of electronic surveillance beginning in 1927 with Olmstead v. United
States which was overturned 40 years later in Katz v. United States); see Olmstead
infra note 92 and accompanying text.
92 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (construing the Fourth Amendment to cover
only material things).
93 See id.
94 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91 (explaining that while the Communications Act of 1934 did not specifically state
that that evidence obtained through wiretapping was inadmissible, it did make it a
crime to intercept communications without the consent of the sender).
95 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91.
96 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91 ("Electronic bugs were not restricted by the Fourth Amendment, by the same
principal applied in Olmstead-they seized nothing tangible. Nor were they sub-
ject to the Communications Act's prohibition on divulgence of intercepted com-
munications because they intercepted sound waves, not wire or radio signals.").
97 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1929) (holding that evidence
obtained through the use of a bug was admissible so long as no physical trespass
took place).
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The Supreme Court diametrically changed its tone in 1967 with
its landmark decision in Katz v. United States. In Katz, the court
explicitly overturned Goldman and Olmstead by holding that a fed-
eral agents' bugging of a regularly used telephone booth was an
illegal search and seizure. The Court reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment did not attach itself to specific places, but rather to
people.98 Here, the court explicated the famous notion of a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy." 99 Since a regular user of a particu-
lar phone had a reasonable expectation of privacy when inside,
evidence obtained via an electronic bug, without a warrant, was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 00
With the Katz decision, law enforcement officials could employ
neither wiretaps nor bugs, without a court order, in their quest for
evidence. t 0 ' Legislation, at that time, failed to address the regula-
tion of court ordered surveillance. 10 2 In response to this legal omis-
sion, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. Title III dealt with wiretapping and procedures
to obtain a court order.10 3 Title III made an exception to the Com-
munications Act's "divulgence prohibition for law enforcement of-
ficers with a court issued warrant, thus bringing wiretapping back
98 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351.
99 See id., 389 U.S. 347 at 353 (holding that since the "Fourth Amendment
governs not only tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral state-
ments, overheard without any 'technical trespass under ... local property law'...
and that the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply 'areas' against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of the Amend-
ment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.").
100 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
101 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91 (explaining that the Communications Act of 1934 and Katz made it difficult for
an officer to use electronic surveillance as a means of collecting evidence against a
suspect. The absence of these tools was devastating because "they were thought to
have a great potential usefulness for investigating and prosecuting conspiratorial
activities such as organized crime, a high-profile and social crime in the 1960's.").
102 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91("The judicial record made it clear that electronic surveillance without a court
order was not prohibited by the Constitution, but new legislation was needed to
define and regulate court ordered surveillance.").
103 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91 (noting how the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act "was the first
legal framework for electronic surveillance of oral and wire (telephone)
communications.").
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into legal use. 10 4 Congress amended Title III in 1986 with the en-
actment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 10 5
Congress wanted to keep on par with the many technological ad-
vancements developed after 1986, particularly e-mail.' 0 6
One feature of the 1986 ECPA was the addition of "electronic
communications" to Title III's protection of oral and wire commu-
nications. 10 7 Since e-mail is a form of "electronic communication"
and the ECPA covers interception of "electronic communication,"
the FBI is allowed to intercept e-mail pursuant to the ECPA. 10 8
While the ECPA provides for the interception of the content of
electronic communication, it does not allow for unrestricted inter-
ception.10 9 An officer must make an application to a judge in order
to intercept any electronic communication.' 11 After examining the
application, the judge may enter an order authorizing such intercep-
tion, provided that there is probable cause for the belief that the
individual whose communication is about to be intercepted has en-
gaged, or is about to engage in a particular offense."' If an officer
104 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
91. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2000) (providing that "the Attorney General,
Deputy General... may authorize the application to a Federal Judge... for.., an
order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2) (2000) (provid-
ing that "any investigative or law enforcement officer who.., has obtained knowl-
edge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence
derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to
the proper performance of his official duties.").
105 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-3127 (2000).
106 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra note
94 (explaining that many of the new technological advancements "stretched the
framework of Title 1II. Electronic mail, data interchange, medical records and fund
transfers are examples of potentially confidential communications that did not fit
within the original Title III definitions of oral and wire communications.").
107 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000).
108 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12 (enumerating the laws governing Car-
nivore, including the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the
ECPA).
109 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2000) (providing that "each application for an
order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication ... shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge. Each
application shall include the following information: (a)identity of the law enforce-
ment officer, (b)a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied
on by the applicant, etc.).
110 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a)-(f) (2000).
Ml See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000) (providing that "upon such application
the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or
322 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
violates any provision of this Act, a customer of an electronic ser-
vice, or the service, itself, may seek recovery in a civil action. 112
Such relief may include an injunction, damages pursuant to
§2707(c), and reasonable attorney's fees.113 It is these remedies for
violations that proponents of Carnivore argue will assure FBI com-
pliance with the ECPA.114
While the standard to intercept the content of one's e-mail is
that of probable cause,'1 5 a judge may issue an order for a pen reg-
ister or trap and trace device, like Carnivore, on the basis that "the
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is rel-
evant to an ongoing criminal investigation."' 1 6 This lower burden
of proof, along with the unique nature of pen registers and trap and
trace devices on the Internet environment is a demonstration of the
inadequacy of current wiretapping laws.
approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications ... if the judge
determines that there is probable cause for the belief that the individual is commit-
ting, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense." In addition,
§ 2518(b) permits a judge to grant an officer's application if there is "probable
cause for the belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be
obtained through such interception." § 2518(c) allows interception if the judge de-
termines that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."). See
infra part II for a discussion of "probable cause."
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2000) ("Any provider of electronic communication
service, subscriber, or customer aggrieved by any violation of this chapter... may,
in a civil action, recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation
such relief as may be appropriate.").
113 See 18 U.S.C. §2707(b)-(c) (2000) ("The court may assess as damages in a
civil action under this section the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plain-
tiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case
shall a person (be) entitled to recover (or) receive less than the sum of $1000.").
114 See Kerr's testimony, supra note 76 (arguing that it is unlikely for FBI
agents to violate the ECPA and abuse Carnivore because of their high moral cali-
ber. Furthermore, if violations do occur, agents will be subjected to criminal prose-
cution, civil liability, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2707, and termination.).
115 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12 (explaining that "at least for now, the
government considers tapping your e-mail a serious thing and curtails most of the
FBI's ability to read it."). See also Caroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that
a showing of probable cause includes the facts and circumstances within one's
knowledge sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a
crime has been committed or that property subject to seizure is at a designated
location).
116 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
2002] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CARNIVORE 323
In the wake of terrorist attacks, however, Congress once again
decided to amend provisions of ECPA.117Both the House and the
Senate collectively termed these amendments the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, or more succinctly, the USA Pa-
triot Act, (Patriot Act). 118 The Act, which amends a host of
statutes, including but not limited to ECPA, contains more that 270
sections.' 19Section 216 amended 18 U.S.C. §§3121, 3123, 3124, and
3127 "to clarify that the pen/trap statute applies to a broad variety
of communications technologies."I2 0 1n contrast with the 1986 ver-
sion of §3127, the current statute explicitly includes e-mail inter-
ception programs like Carnivore. 121
III. (A) THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE ECPA TO CARNIVORE
BEFORE THE PATRIOT ACT
As previously mentioned, the impetus in enacting the ECPA
was to keep up with the ever-growing realm of super technolo-
gies.122 ECPA, however, prior to September 11, 2001, did not cover
117 President Bush signed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Provid-
ing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, herein-
after Patriot Act, into law on October 26, 2001. See Martha Mendoza, Response to
Terror: New Anti-Terror Law Brings Consternation; Security: Officials and Lawyers
Try to Decipher Complex Provisions, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2001 at 4.
118 Pub. L. No. 107-56 (HR 3162) (2001); see also Neil Lewis and Robert
Pear, A Nation Challenged: Legislation; Terror Law Nears Votes in House and Sen-
ate, N.Y. TIMES, October 5, 2001 at B8.
119 Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
120 Field Guidance on New Authorities, at http//: www.epic.org/privacy/ter-
rorism/DOJguidance.pdf (last visited January 8, 2001) (enumerating the effects of
the Patriot Act on different statutes). "Section 216 updates the pen/trap statute in
three important ways: (1) the amendments clarify that law enforcement may use
pen/trap orders to trace communications on the Internet and other computer net-
works; (2) pen/trap orders issued by federal courts now have nationwide effect,
and (3) law enforcement authorities must file a special report with the court when-
ever they use a pen/trap order to install their own monitoring device ... on com-
puters belonging to a public provider." Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2001)
("the term 'pen register' means a device or process which records or decodes dial-
ing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or
.facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided,
however, that such information does not include the contents of the
communication.").
121 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2001).
122 See An Overview of Electronic Surveillance: History and Status supra, note
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the use of Carnivore. 123 In order to come to an understanding as to
why ECPA was inapplicable it is essential to understand the way in
which trap and trace/pen registers function on a traditional tele-
phone line. 124 In contrast to these more traditional taps, one must
further analyze the way in which these same surveillance tools oper-
ate when the Internet becomes involved. When placed on a tele-
phone line, trap and trace/ pen registers only collect the telephone
numbers of the incoming and out going calls.125 The 1986 ECPA
defined a "pen register" as a device which "records or decodes elec-
tronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or other-
wise transmitted on the telephone line to which such a device is
attached. '' 126 Immediately one recognizes that the information
gathered by Carnivore did not fall within the plain meaning of the
statute. 127 Carnivore gathers, in its less invasive form, the header of
an e-mail not impulses that "identify the numbers dialed. ' 128 This
header does not contain any numbers like the information gathered
by trap and trace/ pen registers. In addition, it collects the URL
addresses of the sites that the suspect visits. 129 It cannot be de-
bated. This information goes far beyond the non-identifying num-
bers collected by traditional traps.
What are the implications of this sweeping, intrusive search?
In collecting information more than just the statutorily recognized
numbers, Carnivore is not only functioned outside the ECPA, but it
did not even functioning as a trap and trace device nor as a pen
register. With the advancements of technology, courts have been
123 See Field Guidance, supra note 120 (explaining that "when congress en-
acted the pen/trap statute in 1986, it could not anticipate the dramatic expansion in
electronic communications that would occur in the following fifteen years. Thus,
the statute contained certain language that appeared to apply to telephone com-
munications and did not unambiguously encompass communications over the com-
puter networks.").
124 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
125 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
126 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2000).
127 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000) (excluding "any device used by a provider
or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording
as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or
customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other purposes in
the ordinary course of business.").
128 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000).
129 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
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reluctant to squeeze new surveillance tools under the narrow defini-
tion provided under the ECPA. 130
Brown v. Waddell is an example of such reluctance.13' In
Brown, the Fourth Circuit questioned whether the implementation
of a display pager by law enforcement officials constituted a use of
a pen registered as defined by the ECPA.132 The Circuit Court, re-
versing the determination that the pager fell within the ambit of the
ECPA, held that the device was not a "pen register."'1 33 The court
scrutinized the statue, extrapolating very important require-
ments.1 34 The court noted that the statute requires the pen register
to be attached to the telephone line.135 The pager, a stand alone
piece of equipment, was not affixed to the telephone line. Simi-
larly, Carnivore is not attached to a telephone line, it is attached to
an ISP's network, a data center.136 Given this distinction, under the
holding of Brown, an in-depth analysis leads to the conclusion that
130 See Testimony of Robert Corn-Revere before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, April 6, 2000 (explaining that
courts have interpreted the ECPA very narrowly and applied it only when a device
fits within the plain meaning of the statute. "Consistent with the statutory language
... reviewing courts have interpreted these provisions literally.").
131 See Brown v. Wadell, 50 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of a
clone pager, one that mimics the signals coming into another pager, did not fall
within the ECPA's definition of a "pen register" because of its ability to function
without being affixed to a telephone line. The courts rational was based heavily on
statutory interpretation and the legislative history of the ECPA. For example, the
court stated that "the type of communication that it receives fits perfectly into the
general definition of the 'electronic communications' that are subject to" the more
stringent requirement of probable cause.).
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id. 50 F.3d 285 at 289 (noting that both the attachment, or in this case,
the non-attachment, of the device's as well as the signals received are dispositive to
the devices classification as a pen register).
135 See id. 50 F.3d 285 at 290 (quoting from 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)(2000) "a 'pen
register' is defined by statute as a device which records or decodes electronic or
other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the
telephone line to which such device is attached).
136 See About.com, supra note 13 (describing the manner in which an FBI
agent attaches Carnivore. "For Carnivore to gain access to this much data, its hard-
ware must be plugged directly into the network at a central location. Because most
Internet-based communications in the USA flow through large Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), the FBI would typically install a Carnivore box inside an ISP data
center. Controlled physical and network access improves the system's overall
security.").
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Carnivore would not have been a trap and trace device nor a pen
register as defined under the ECPA.
Given the reluctance in Brown to find a device not specifically
attached to a telephone line within the statute, a court would have
been unlikely to have extended the ECPA to Carnivore because it
does not collect "numbers to which calls have been placed." Carni-
vore captures e-mail addresses. Such a function differs greatly from
that of a pen register or trap and trace device defined in the statute.
The Brown court specifically recognized that the signals received by
the pager were not telephonic, but rather radio waves. 137 This dif-
ference placed the pager out of the realm of "pen registers" and
into the realm of "electronic communication."'' 38 If a court would
have found the non-attachment as a deviation from ECPA, the fact
that Carnivore collects not numbers, but addresses, would have
been as great a deviation.
The fact that Carnivore collects e-mail addresses raises another
problem separate from the exclusion of the system under the
statue's definition of a trap and trace device or pen register. It can
be argued that this information is not purely transactional, but is
rather "content." ECPA defines "content" as "any information
concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communica-
tion."'139 It only contemplates the retrieval of telephone num-
bers. 140 But as pointed out, e-mail addresses are not numbers; they
are combinations of letters and numbers. The Congressional intent
in enacting the ECPA was to exclude information bearing any re-
semblance to "content" from the section defining trap and trace de-
vices and pen registers.' 4 '
In Brown, the 4th Circuit engaged in an analysis of the legisla-
tive history behind the 1986 federal wiretapping laws. 142 It noted
that Congress sought to distinguish technologies that are capable of
137 See Brown, 50 F.3d 285 at 289.
138 See id.
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2000).
140 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2000).
141 See Brown, 50 F.3d 285.
142 See Brown, 50 F.3d 285 at 289 (paraphrasing the intent of Congress in
enacting the ECPA. "The principal purpose of the ECPA amendments to Title III
was to extend to 'electronic communications' the same protections against unau-
thorized interceptions that Title III had been providing for 'oral' and 'wire' com-
munications via common carrier transmissions. This extension was found necessary
by Congress because of the 'dramatic changes in new computer and telecommuni-
cations technologies that had created new risks to privacy.').
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intercepting substantive content from those that cannot. 43 "Con-
tent" information is the type of information in which people have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.144 In quoting from Congress, the
court concluded that those forms of technology that intercept con-
tent without a warrant based on probable cause are illegal. 145 Such
a distinction can be seen, pointed out the court, by Congress' recog-
nition of pagers capable of collecting alphanumeric (letters and dig-
its) characters.146 These pagers collect substantive content. If
Congress and the court believed that the alphanumeric pagers col-
lect "substantive content," then the same protection should be af-
forded to alphanumeric e-mail addresses.
Steinheardt, Associate Director of the ACLU, pointed out in
his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that e-mail ad-
dresses differ from phone numbers in two significant ways.' 47 First
of all, argues Steinhardt, many people, over the course of time, may
be assigned the same phone number.1 48 Phone numbers are not
personalized like an e-mail address. As a matter of fact, E-mail
servers are designed so as not to assign the same e-mail address
twice. 149 Every address is unique. Secondly, the classification of e-
mail addresses as "content" is strengthened by the fact that an e-
mail address may contain some "information concerning the sub-
stance, purport, or meaning of that communication. ' 150 For exam-
ple, an address like Bob@pornpics.com may contain information,
namely the wording following the @ symbol and the sender's name
(Bob), as to the content of the e-mail. There is no specific amount
of information required to fall under the classification of "con-
143 See Brown, 50 F.3d 285 at 291 (explicating the different requirements for
pen registers and wiretaps. The former requires a showing of probable cause be-
cause of its ability to intercept "content.").
144 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979) (holding that a pen register was
incapable of intruding on a legitimate expectation of privacy because it recorded
only phone numbers, information routinely turned over to third parties).
145 See Brown, 50 F.3d 285.
146 See id.
147 See Testimony of Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU
before House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on the Constitution, (July
24,200) (explaining the differences between traditional pen registers and Carni-
vore. Carnivore, unlike traditional pen registers collects e-mail addresses.).
148 See id.
149 If an individual tries to duplicate an e-mail address, a message will come
up stating that "this user name has already been taken."
150 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2000).
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tent."151 Section 2510(8) only calls for "any" information concern-
ing the substance of a given communication. 152 Since there is a
possibility that an e-mail address may contain information as to the
content of the e-mail, it is itself, content.
Additionally noted Steinheardt, as a trap and trace/pen regis-
ter, Carnivore is capable of collecting the URL addresses that a
suspect has visited. 153 This information reveals much in the way of
content. If I visit www.childporn.com, the content of the informa-
tion perceived while at the site is not precise, but quite obvious,
nonetheless.
The categorization of e-mail and URL addresses as content
based is a significant factor, if not the most relevant to consider,
when determining which provision, if any, of ECPA applies. 154
Under §3123, as a pen register or trap and trace device, only a
showing that the "information likely to be obtained by the installa-
tion is relevant" is required. 155 But as previously stated, this stan-
dard only applies when the information sought is not "content."
Once "content" is involved, the burden of proof increases to the
more stringent "probable cause" pursuant to §2518.156 Under these
requirements, law enforcement officials utilizing Carnivore, even in
its least intrusive manner, as an alleged pen register or trap and
trace device, must be required to put forth probable cause. Since
the ECPA does not require a showing of probable cause for the
implementation of a pen register or a trap and trace device, it does
not cover a beast such as Carnivore.
A problem related to Carnivore's ability to capture content in-
formation when functioning as a pen register or trap and trace de-
151 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2000).
152 See 18 U.S.C., § 2510(8) (2000).
153 See Testimony of Barry Steinhardt, supra note 147 (stating that "beyond
e-mail addresses, there are unanswered questions about whether pen registers and
trap and trace devices can be used to obtain other sensitive information. For exam-
ple, can they be used to collect URL's of sites that a target visits, the names of files
that are transmitted, subject headers of e-mail, or other transaction logs of Internet
activity.).
154 See Brown, 50 F.3d 255 at 292 (explaining that information that is not
content based is not the type in which people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. For example, it has been noted that "there are no legitimate expectations
of privacy in the telephone numbers that one calls, so that no warrant is required
by the Fourth Amendment to install a pen register.").
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (2000).
156 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000).
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vice is its ability to capture content as a "content wiretap." 157 In
contrast with its functionality as a pen register or a trap and trace
device, as a wiretap, Carnivore is capable of reading the entire con-
tents of a given e-mail. 158 To be used in this capacity, a law enforce-
ment official must get an order based on a showing of probable
cause.159 When acting as a pen register or trap and trace device, the
wiretapping capabilities of the system are "turned off. 1 60 In es-
sence, Carnivore may be converted from a content wiretap to a pen
register or trap and trace device. 161 In at least one case, New York
courts have addressed the issue of a convertible wiretap. 62 In Peo-
ple v. Bialostok, the Court of Appeals held that a pen register capa-
ble of being used as a full blown wiretap on a telephone line could
be utilized only upon a showing of probable cause. 163 The fact that
the wiretapping capabilities of the register had been turned off did
not erase the need for the heightened showing. 64 This rationale
has been restated in subsequent cases, quoting the general holding
of Bialostok.165 Such an analysis, while based on state law, is analo-
gous to Carnivore.
157 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
158 See id.
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000).
160 See Carnivore FAQ, supra note 12.
161 See Testimony of Robert Corn-Revere, supra note 130 (explaining the
specialized problem of devices that need to be converted from content wiretaps to
pen registers. This dual nature causes much confusion as to their classifications and
therefore the applicability of the ECPA.).
162 See People v. Bialostok, 610 N.E. 2d 374 (1993) (holding that a pen regis-
ter that could be transformed into an eavesdropping device required a showing of
probable cause to obtain a warrant for its use. The officer was able to transform
the pen register by attaching an audio cable, a tape recorder and a wire to activate
the recorder's remote start. Even though the pen register had the capabilities of
performing as an eavesdropping device, no evidence of the sort was introduced at
trial.).
163 See id.
164 See Biolostak, 610 N.E. 2d 374 at 377 (clarifying that the "People's case is
no stronger because the audio functions were disabled and no conversations were
actually overheard. The issue is not of the reasonableness of the search but statu-
tory compliance .... The purpose of having a warrant is to ... protect the people
from having to rely on the good conduct of the officer in the field for the protec-
tion of their right to be free from unreasonable searches.).
165 See People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731 (1998) (holding that defendants had
standing to seek judicial suppression of telephonically acquired evidence by a pen
register that had the capabilities to intercept and record either digital or aural
transmissions. Such communications could be recorded depending upon whether
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If the ability of Carnivore to function as a "content" wiretap
raises the standard from relevancy to probable cause, what may be
said about Carnivore's ability to act as a "trunk side" wiretap? As a
"trunk side" wiretap, Carnivore may access the e-mail of every user
on the Internet. 66 The FBI argues that they may place a filter on
Carnivore to prevent such collection.167 But, the Bialostok court
quoting from the Court of Appeals' opinion in People v. Gallina
states "that no unauthorized eavesdropping may have occurred is
beside the point, because it is the potential for abuse that is the
focus of the analysis. '168 Such a statement directly refutes the posi-
tion of the FBI. FBI agents may be "trustworthy" and may not
employ Carnivore as a "content" wiretap or a "trunk side" wiretap.
But, such abstention is "beside the point." What really matters is
that Carnivore, as a "content" wiretap carries with it the high possi-
bility of abuse. Even more potentially abusive is its function as a
"trunk side" wiretap. Under the logic of Bialostok, the ability to
convert requires a focus on this potential for abuse and an adjust-
ment of the standard of proof required to install Carnivore.
III. (B) GOVERNMENT'S RESPONE TO THE
'INAPPLICABILITY PROBLEM'
Recognizing that there was an increased need to use programs
like Carnivore, so as to keep track of potential terrorists, the Presi-
dent signed into law the Patriot Act. 169 As mentioned above, the
Patriot Act changed the literal definition of "pen register" so as to
include programs like Carnivore. In doing so, the fact that Carni-
vore does not collect impulses that "identify the numbers dialed" is
no longer fatal to the application.
The fact that the statute, however, is seemingly applicable does
not solve everything. For example, the Patriot Act does not deline-
ate the difference between "content" and "non content" informa-
tion as discussed above. Carnivore still collects content information
the officer switched on an audio switch. While in "audio off" mode, the device only
intercepted telephone numbers.).
166 See Schwartz, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
167 See Letter from John Collingwood, supra note 71.
168 See Bialostok, 610 N.E. 2d 375 at 375.
169 Neil Lewis and Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: Legislation; Error Law
Near Votes in House and Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at B8 (quoting Attorney
General Ashcroft, "without the new legislation, law enforcement authorities lack
all of the tools they need to thwart terrorists.").
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and is treated under the new law as if it does not. This distinction is
far more relevant to the intrusion of privacy than that of inclusion
under the definition of "pen register".
IV. CARNIVORE TAKES A BITE OUT OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
As a result of allowing Carnivore to operate, even in its least
ferocious form, without a showing of probable cause, every citizens'
right to privacy on the internet slowly diminishes.170 In other
words, allowing these warrantless searches implicates the Fourth
Amendment. 171 The Fourth Amendment, governing all govern-
mental searches and seizures, contains two separate clauses: "a pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a
requirement that probable cause support each warrant issued.' 17 2
While the problem presented by Carnivore is an amalgam of the
two clauses, the strongest argument involves unreasonable
searches. Without a warrant based on probable cause a Carnivore
search of header information (To: and From: statements) is unrea-
sonable.17 3 In order to explain this problem in depth, we must de-
cide if, according to Katz, people have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in their e-mail header information. 74 In doing so, Katz
tells us to answer two questions: 1) whether the individual, by his
conduct, has "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and 2) whether the individual's subjective expectation of pri-
vacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as
170 See Elinor Abreu, ACLU Investigating Carnivore's Diet, http://www.the
standard.com/article/display/0,1151,16877,00.html (last visited October 6, 2000)
(quoting David Sobel, attorney for EPIC. Sobel says, "This system potentially
compromises the privacy of all of the ISP's subscribers.").
171 See 68 Am. Jur. 2d § 327 (2000) (explaining how the use of electronic sur-
veillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. "With the exception
of situations involving the national security, electronic surveillance ... constitutes
a search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
172 Kevin Allen, Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 88 GEO. L. J. 883 (2000)
(explaining the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. "The Supreme Court im-
poses a presumptive warrant requirement for searches and seizures, and generally
requires probable cause for a warrantless search or seizure to be "reasonable.").
173 See id.
174 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (holding that a defendant had a "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" in conversations taking place in a telephone booth).
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'reasonable.'' 1 75 The first prong of the test is purely subjective
while the second prong is objective. 176
In explicating this second objective standard, courts often look
at the nature of the intrusion and whether or not a third party has
access to the information revealed in the search. 177 For example,
the Court in Smith concluded that there was no objective expecta-
tion of privacy in phone numbers retrieved by a pen register.178
Since the search did not reveal any '"content" and the telephone
company had access to these numbers, the second prong of the Katz
test was not satisfied. 179
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. Miller that a defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in his bank records since the bank was a third party to which he
disclosed his affairs when he opened the account.' 80 While the
Court did not focus as much on the nature of the intrusion, i.e.
whether the information contained "content," it heavily empha-
sized that the Fourth Amendment was not a bar to information re-
vealed to a third party.18'
175 See id. at 361 (explaining how the twofold requirements work. For exam-
ple "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy ... On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being
overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unrea-
sonable). See also 68 Am. Jur. 2d §327 (outlining the framework for determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. "Whether a warrantless eaves-
dropping by the police violates the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the
defendant had a justified expectation of privacy at the place and the time of the
communication.").
176 See id.
177 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (applying the Katz analysis, the Court says
that "it is important to begin by specifying precisely the nature of the state activity
that is challenged." The Court noted that the pen register installed on defendant's
telephone line did not retrieve any contents. In addition, the Court focused on the
fact that third parties, namely the telephone company, had access to phone num-
bers dialed by their customers. These two factors led the court to conclude that
there was no objective expectation of privacy in such phone numbers.).
178 See id.
179 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 745.
180 See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (reversing an order of the appellate
court which found that defendant's bank records should have been suppressed.
The Court held that by giving the records to the bank, defendant surrendered his
privacy expectations in them.).
181 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 443. (explaining that "this Court has held repeat-
edly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to the Government authorities,
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More recently, the United States Court of Appeals reinforced
the notion that one who conveys information to a third party
thereby relinquishes his reasonable expectation of privacy in
such.182 In U.S. v. Hambrick, the fourth circuit Court of Appeals
refused to suppress billing records which contained non-content in-
formation.18 3 The Hambrick court followed an identical approach
to the Court in Smith v. Maryland. It first addressed the issue of
content. It found that the defendant's name and several of his
phone numbers, the information seized, did not contain any con-
tent. 8 4 The Appellate Court next turned its attention to the fact
that the defendant voluntarily handed the information over to a
third party, the ISP.185 Such an act, as in Smith, precluded the de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment argument. 186
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed).
182 See U.S. v. Hambrick, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665 (4th Cir. 2000) (af-
firming the judgment of the district court holding that defendant did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in non content information given to an internet
service provider in order to establish an account. Hambrick is more than just a
modern application of Smith. In dicta, the court stated that "in this case, the gov-
ernment never utilized the non-content information retrieved from the (ISP) to
attain additional content information, such as the substance of Hambrick's e-
mails." See Hambrick at 12. Additionally, the court recognized the 'revolutionary'
"nature of the internet as well as the vast extent of communications it has initiated.
We do not address here any subsequent use of the non-content information to
reveal the substance of an Internet user's e-mails or other file content." This is an
important distinction between the information obtained here and that obtained by
Carnivore. Many times, FBI agents use the alleged "non-content" header informa-
tion to obtain a warrant seeking the contents of a defendant's e-mail. Under Ham-
brick, such a use might change the holding.).
183 See id. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665 at 11 (explaining that the information
in question included Hambrick's name, address, home, work, and fax phone num-
bers. The court reiterated the holding in Miller, namely that 'the issuance of a
subpoena to a third party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the
rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time the
subpoena issued."' ).
184 See id. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665 at 12 (stating that "while under cer-
tain circumstances a person may have an expectation of privacy in content infor-
mation, a person does not have an interest in account information given to an ISP
... which is non-content information).
185 See id.
186 See id. (relying on Miller, the Court of Appeals concluded that this infor-
mation is "merely third party business records, and therefore, [defendant's] Fourth
Amendment claim cannot succeed").
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Assuming that a suspect believes, subjectively, that he has an
expectation of privacy in the information collected by Carnivore
and applying these principles relating to the second prong of Katz,
we can conclude that this information falls within the ambit of
Fourth Amendment protection. First, the information collected by
Carnivore, as stated previously, is content information, under the
ECPA. The Supreme Court in Smith strengthens this conclusion.187
The Court defined "content" information as any information that
gives an indication as to the "purport of any communication be-
tween the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen regis-
ters."' 88 The information seized by Carnivore would fall under the
Smith definition of "content" because it not only gives an indication
as to the content of the communication, as discussed above, but also
reveals the identities of the sender and the receiver and is an ac-
knowledgement that the delivery of a message was "completed."
The inquiry that must be made is whether the information col-
lected by Carnivore was ever turned over to a third party. There is
absolutely no reason to assume that the e-mail addresses that Car-
nivore intercepts have been turned over to anyone other than the
receiver and sender of any message in question. Often times people
do not give out their e-mail addresses for fear of receiving un-
wanted "Spam." Other times, an individual may create more than
one e-mail account and only give out one address, saving the other
as an account for privileged senders. Absent some concrete evi-
dence of exposure to third parties, it is not safe to assume that any
given e-mail address has been made available. Since the informa-
tion collected by Carnivore is "content" under both the ECPA and
Smith and the information is not voluntarily handed over to a third
party, one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in it, satisfying the
second prong of the Katz test. Since both prongs of the test are
met, collection of this information without a warrant forms a prima
facie case for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
187 See Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (quoting from the holding in U.S. v. New
York Tel. Co, 434 U.S. 159, 167, the court defined "content" information).
188 See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Such an analysis is not to suggest that technology has no place
in the crime- fighting world. It is only meant to point out pitfalls
into which we, the government, and law enforcement officials might
step when introducing the future to the present. The fundamental
rationale behind Carnivore, namely to stop Internet crime, is not
something that should be scoffed at. The goal of the tool is lauda-
ble. But, the tool itself, enhances the danger involved. Carnivore is,
all joking aside, a beast. It devours our Internet privacy. If people
on the net are to feel secure, we must put a leash on the beast. In
other words, the most intrusive aspects of Carnivore, namely its
ability to collect all mail and activity on an ISP must be done away
with. Carnivore's program must be reconfigured - permanently.
If law enforcement officials are not willing to mitigate Carni-
vore's potential for abuse, then there is only one more viable op-
tion; Congress must change the law. The ECPA must be amended
to reflect the ease at which new technologies may obliterate our
right to privacy. Specifically, the EPCA must introduce a hybrid
category-a definition that covers a device capable of morphing
from a "pen register" to a "content wiretap" to a "trunk side wire-
tap." Congress must consider just exactly how ferocious a device
such as Carnivore may be.
If neither road is traveled, then Internet users all over the
world, not just the United States, are left vulnerable. The only
thing standing in the way of such abuse is the "trust us" attitude of
the FBI. Such a notion is archaic and contrary to the existence of
the Fourth Amendment. If Carnivore cannot be caged, then we
might as well consider our right to privacy as unprotected as it was
millions of years ago when dinosaurs of a different breed roamed
the earth.
Gina Tufaro

